Unions currently represent approximately 16 percent of the work force, down from the high watermark of 35 percent organized during the heyday of the CIO. Some estimates say that by the year 2000, unions may represent only five percent of the private sector work force. This is a startling figure, especially when one considers that due to de-industrialization, manufacturing jobs are declining at a rapid pace. No union has been able to consistently organize large numbers of private-sector workers. This inability to organize new workers into unions does not only mean we won't gain new members; it threatens every aspect of the labor movement. For instance:
- We are increasingly unable to improve wages and benefits for our members, because we no longer control industries and markets.
- We are not able to move labor's larger social and legislative agenda.
- Our decline in the private sector will undermine our efforts to organize and protect public-sector workers.
- The combination of increasingly inferior contracts and employers' anti-union offensives creates a downward spiral that makes organizing even more difficult.
Despite our inability to organize, we continue to rely on the same approach to organizing based on the NLRB model of approaching organizing from a site-by-site approach. Additionally, we rely on the rules and procedures set up through the NLRB to organize workers to win a "fair and impartial" elections. Unfortunately our model of organizing hasn't worked for 37 years. Successful organizing depends on the ability to organize more workers than the number of jobs created each year. While the number of workers who belong to unions has remained constant, the percentage of workers who belong to unions has been steadily dropping.
While the current political and economic climate is difficult for unions, we must also confront difficult questions on why we didn't successfully organize in friendlier circumstances. We need to understand how to adapt to changing situations - diversity in the workplace, the shift to a service-based economy, plant closings and de-industrialization, and the other problems we face. We must relearn how to capture imaginations, generate enthusiasm, and articulate a vision that can mobilize union and nonunion workers. And we need to figure out how to use our remaining power to organize now.
Our current model for organizing has remained essentially the same for 30 years. It involves:
- Targeting a specific site.
- Building an organizing committee that gets workers to sign cards, and then, petitioning for an election.
- Conducting an election, and, if successful,
- Attempting to bargain a contract.
All of our efforts go into the election campaign, and we spend precious little energy in exerting power over the employer until after we have won an election and attempt to bargain a contract.
Organizing efforts are done in a vacuum based often on "hot" targets, rather than as part of a company, regional, industry, market or community-based strategy. The campaign is won or lost on the narrow issue of which is more credible, the union's promises or the company's threats. And we are losing the crucial argument to management, that is that management is powerful while the union is weak.
Organizing that is done in a vacuum and that isolates workers from other workers and their community is doomed to failure. Workers will organize and take risks when they see themselves as part of a movement that has a chance to succeed. We have come to a crossroad in the history of labor, and our choices will determine if we, as a labor movement, survive.
What I would like to propose is that this is not the first time in our history that we have come to this type of crossroad, and that if we learn from the past, we still have the opportunity to turn this crisis to our advantage. There have been at least two other times that we had to come to grips with fundamental change: the first in the period from the 1860's to the turn of the century, and the second from the 1930's to the 1950's. In both of these times, the arrangement between employers and workers disintegrated, and unions were able to respond by redefining the basis of the labor movement, gaining enough support to persevere or even grow, and forcing a new accommodation with the capital interests that controlled the economic base of the country.
In the first instance I cite above, commonly known as the Industrial Revolution, this country rapidly went through a transformation from a rural, agricultural-based economy to an industrial giant, dominated by monopolies in all segments of the manufacturing economy. It featured an incredible concentration of wealth into the hands of a very few people, the development of whole new industries, the growth of a communications and transportation system that enabled the industrial behemoths to trade over the breadth of the land. Most importantly, it featured the introduction of the factory system, which required a whole new type of worker, the industrial worker, willing to work for wages, able to adapt to the pace of the machine, and willing to accept the notion that time was measured by the clock as opposed to the more natural rhythm of nature.
The transformation to a factory-based economy was not accomplished without resistance from workers and their unions. In fact, this was a very turbulent and violent time in the history of workers and saw the formation of not one labor body, the AFL, but three (the other two being the Knights of Labor and the Industrial Workers of the World). The defining strike, in my opinion, occurred one hundred years ago with the strike at the Homestead Works in Pittsburgh, where the issue was who was going to control production, craft workers or the bosses who owned the miffs. After a bitter struggle, Carnegie defeated the old Amalgamated Ironworkers, who faded into history, and the interests of capital reigned supreme in the factories.
However, the AFL survived, even prospered in places, because it formulated a philosophy, business unionism, based on the old craft principle of controlling the knowledge of particular jobs. It meant for unions that the factories would remain nonunion, because those jobs were going through a process of de-skilling that culminated in the rise of Taylorism, a concept that was adapted by Henry Ford in Its development of the mass production system. That notwithstanding, unions survived, because they reached an accommodation with capital in areas where unions had strength, such as the Building Trades, and we survived to fight another day.
By the late 1920's, however, the labor movement was at a low point. This was caused by, a number of factors, but one of the keys was an aggressive campaign, launched following World War I, to eradicate the growing power of unions. Called the American Plan, its attempt was to abolish all unions, even those unions in the Building Trades, under the guise of protecting democracy from the "red menace" unions represented in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution. Unions came attack on all fronts, both directly, through attacks upon existing unions, and through the introduction of a concept called Welfare Capitalism. Welfare Capitalism was not at all dissimilar to today's attempts to institute employer-dominated Employee Involvement programs that attempt to put a human face on the incredible hardship faced by factory workers.
Though slow in realizing the reality, unions had to come to grips with the fact that the old deal was dead. Employers had decided, for a number of reasons, such as high unemployment and control over the political process, that they were in a position to eradicate unions once and for all. A number of unions, most notably the Mineworkers and the unions in the needle trades, realized that the only salvation was to try and organize the vast number of workers that the trades believed to be not organizable, that is the unskilled factory workers whose numbers dominated the employment market. Initially, the AFL formed a committee called the Committee on Industrial Organizing. But after bitter debate caused by the internal structural difficulties faced by craft unions trying to organize industrial workers, this committee, and the unions that formed it, split with the AFL to form the Congress on Industrial Organizations. This split, coming during the Great Depression, helped foster an unprecedented period of unionization. The auto, steel, rubber, electronics, and oil industries all showed massive gains in organizing under and caused by the formation of the CIO.
These unions were successful for a number of reasons, but one of their bases for power was the development of a strong shop-steward system. This was before the days of a legalistic grievance- arbitration process. In the early days, the steward was first and foremost an organizer, who led workers in regular shop-floor confrontations with their supervisors over the basic working conditions facing workers. Improvements were won, power was gained for workers, and ultimately a new accommodation had to be worked out with the corporations because of the strength that these unions acquired through organizing.
The new deal was quite simple. The constant interruptions in production had to end, and management had to be able to manage its plants. Therefore, unions agreed to allow managers the right to manage their plants in exchange for management agreeing to recognize the unions' right to exist. The parties would bargain over wages, hours, and working conditions, but implicit in this deal was that the bargaining would be over improvements in these basic conditions. The government would assume the role of referee, remaining neutral (more neutral to one side or the other depending on who was in the White House), and unions would clean up their act, purging the radicals who made the organizing gains possible in the first place, and supporting the foreign policy initiatives put forth by the United States government.
This was the deal that most of us inherited when we entered the labor movement. We all knew the rules and how the game was to be played. Now we are challenged to take a look at the events of the last 12 years and decide if we believe that the deal is still in place. I contend that it is not. What we have experienced over the last decade has been union busting, decertification, concession bargaining, the gutting of basic labor law, the introduction of team concept, plant closings and deindustrialization, exporting of jobs to Mexico and beyond, criminal polluting, the disintegration of the two-party system, and stonewalling by management in grievance and arbitration procedures. The list goes on and on. The rules have changed, and we have been slow to realize the implications. It is time for a rebirth of labor, perhaps not in the shape or style that we now know it, but, like unionists in the 1930's, we must find a way to organize that reflects the needs of those who share our pain but with whom we believe it is impossible to organize.
The Deal Is Dead
Discussion Questions
Think of the union as an animal. How would you describe it and why?
In this article, it is argued that the labor movement is in decline because of its inability to organize new workers within the framework of the National Labor Relations Act. How do you respond to that argument? Does having over 80% of the workers in this country not belonging to a union have an effect on your local?
The article goes on to argue that historically the labor movement has been in similar positions as we find ourselves today, and that we have come out of decline when we have reached out to people within the context of a larger movement. Do you feel that we can or should respond in that fashion today?
How has the labor movement as an institution, responded to the decline in the percentage of workers that it represents?
How has your local responded to the decline in the power and influence of the labor movement?
Will the labor movement survive as a vibrant, progressive force in society if the trends of the last twenty years continue? What would be the effect upon society if the labor movement would not survive?
Labor and Politics:
Exploring Our Options
With the election of the Clinton/Gore ticket, labor finds itself in the position of having both a Democratic president working with a Democratic congress for the first time in twelve years. There are those who have been arguing that labor should be looking to establish an independent political voice outside of the Democratic Party and we are at a point of seeing if the traditional alliance between labor and the Democratic Party is still a viable alliance for labor. Clearly, labor has a number of political issues that must be considered critical, such as Free Trade, Right-to-Work, labor law reform, etc. that must be addressed if labor is to have a chance at regaining strength. The measure of success in labor's political alliance will be easy to measure. Yet, skepticism abounds within labor of the ability and willingness of the Democratic Party to address issues critical to the survival of organized labor and there is reason to question whether democracy can exist without a strong trade union movement.
Our democracy has become increasingly dominated by corporate interests as they have used their money and influence to not only buy access, but to control the political debate. Traditionally, corporate interests have been represented by the Republican Party while the Democrats have represented the interests of working people. However, over the last twenty years, and especially since 1980, we have been experiencing a narrowing in the philosophical difference between the two major political parties as democracy has moved away from the grassroots level and has become dominated by the influence of television and the media.
Television has made campaigning very expensive while simultaneously reducing the need for a large number of grassroots volunteers to communicate the message to the voters. Politicians now survive on their ability to raise substantial sums of money to buy TV time. Corporations, with their vast resources, can raise the money to finance campaigns and therefore are in a much better position than unions to have access to politicians. The wealthy have been able to use their money to finance and buy access regardless of the political affiliation of many of our key political leaders. Therefore, what we have seen over the last few years is a movement by the mainstream of the Democratic Party toward pursuing the corporate agenda.
Evidence is mounting that many working people feel this exclusion from the political process. Ever since the election of JFK the percentage of eligible voters who bother to go to the polls has been decreasing, with barely half voting in the 1988 presidential election. We have experienced a movement to depose of all incumbents, a "throw the bums out" effort to change the system. Others are calling for a constitutional amendment to impose term limitations. And then we had the Perot phenomena that generated unprecedented support from people who felt that only an "outsider" like Perot offered them any alternatives.
For labor, the demise of grassroots democracy means that no longer do we have a political party willing to push an agenda that would keep jobs in our communities, provide for a safer work place, fight for a clean environment, pass meaningful labor law reform, strive for tax fairness and pursue others issues of social justice. If we are to have a future, then we must once again find a way to put our issues on the political agenda.
If we, as a labor movement, are to regain influence in the political arena, we must develop a vision that can once again attract the support of the working people of this country. That means that we must approach our political crisis from an organizing perspective to channel the discontent people feel over being left out of the process to develop the power to influence the political agenda. The long-term question that we must address is can we develop that influence from within the Democratic Party or should we look at alternatives, including establishing our own political party.
There are those who argue that only from within can we effectively recapture our lost influence. We must redouble our efforts, organize to build strength, and reclaim our influence within the Democratic Party since the Democrats already have a substantial power base in government. Others, led by Labor Party Advocates, argue that we need to organize our own political organization and use that organization to set our political agenda. Their argument is that the Democratic Party has already adopted a corporate agenda and is unwilling or unable to change to represent our issues.
These are some of the issues that we need to debate. Most agree that we need to change, yet changing course is always difficult and uncertain. Democracy cannot survive without a strong democratic labor movement to put forth the needs and desires of working men and women. We face a crisis because we are moving ever closer to a one party state that only represents the interests of the wealthiest and most powerful of our country. Our challenge is to begin the discussion on how to restore a democracy that represents all of the people, rather than one that caters only to those who can afford access.
Labor and Politics:
Discussion Questions
Do you agree or disagree with the assertion that the Democratic Party is moving towards representing a corporate agenda and away from the labor movement's position? Explain.
How can we encourage participation, including voting, from our members? From the community at large?
What steps should we take if we are to regain our influence within the Democratic Party?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of forming an independent political organization, as is advocated by the Labor Party Advocates?
How would having the government support labor's position on key issues, such as free trade or the anti-scab legislation, affect our relationship with the corporations who employ our members?
Unions, regardless of whether they are utilizing the Service Model or the Organizing Model, need to take the time to develop a strategy for the direction that they want their organization to go. Virtually every organization from businesses, to government, to churches have some sense of what their organization stands for, what they want to accomplish, some specific steps or actions to take to reach their objective(s). Unions, probably because of their peculiar nature, often times don't take the steps necessary to develop a strategic plan and a method of accomplishing their objectives.
The barriers to planning for unions include the political nature of the organization. The democratic nature of unions is one of its truly redeeming features. However, a side effect of democracy is that unions become politicized with a particular faction or group in power and others who oppose the existing leadership are often shunned or excluded. Instead of capitalizing on the diversity of views, ideas, and positions that exist inside of a union, unions often become dominated by the views and opinions of those who are in leadership and exclude opposing ideas. This limits the scope of discussion, causes divisions within the union, and limits the participation within the union to those who follow the leadership.
The lack of resources is another barrier to effective union planning. Unions are, for the most part, volunteer organizations that do not have the money to have but the smallest of staffs. People who serve on many union positions from shop stewards to executive board members, do so without pay and on their own time. There are few resources available for them to reflect on the nature of their organization and the challenges facing them (often until it is too late), and to invest in the relationships and analysis that can provide strategic and tactical direction for the union. As a result, unions most often stay in a reactive posture, responding to the forces around them rather than developing their own aggressive agenda for the union to follow.
Unions are also often reluctant to try a notion such as strategic planning. There is the fear of the unknown as well as the fear that there is more to lose than to gain by trying something new and different. Furthermore, there is a lack of knowledge about how to proceed on developing a strategic plan for the union. What techniques should be used, who should be included in the planning process, who can conduct the planning meetings, and how or should a plan be implemented are all concerns that are barriers to effective planning.
Once a union decides that despite the barriers it is going to go ahead in its efforts to develop a plan for the union, it must realize that for the plan to be worthwhile, the union must commit sufficient time and resources to the effort. And for the plan to be acceptable to the entire union, a cross section of the union must be involved in the planning process. Sufficient time must be allowed for the people involved in the planning process to work together in developing a vision for the union that provides for an overall direction. Time is essential because it is at this point in planning that the barriers presented by the political nature of the union must be identified and overcome. Agendas of the various participants must be identified and dealt with in as democratic a manner as is possible as the group develops a vision for the union that the entire union body can accept as a legitimate direction for the union.
While the first step of developing an overall vision for the union may seem to be to be a waste of time to some, it is crucial for the union to go through this first step as it sets the framework for all of the organizational development and tactics that the union will utilize in developing and implementing specific actions. For instance, a union that decides that it sees itself as an Organizing Model union that is going to develop power through a stronger shop floor and community presence will develop much different plans that a union that sees itself developing as a union that pursues a cooperative agenda with management, or a union that decides that it is best suited to remain as a Service Model union that needs to emphasize its ability to deliver for the membership.
Once unions have arrived at a vision of what they want to see their unions become, it becomes necessary to do an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the unions, as well as to look at the environment in which the unions operate. One technique that can be useful in this analysis is a SWOT analysis, where SWOT represents the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats of the union. In performing this analysis it is possible to identify strengths to be built on, weaknesses to be overcome, opportunities that can be exploited, and potential threats to the union that must be overcome. By utilizing brainstorming techniques, the planners identify as many possibilities in each area as they can and then prioritize those possibilities to develop a number of agendas upon which the union can build or take action.
Once the union has done a self-analysis, it can then move into developing a plan of action. A first step is to identify goals that can be accomplished. These goals should include short-term as well as longer-term objectives, and should reflect tangible gains to the union that fit into the overall vision that has been developed for the union. In addition, a reasonable timetable needs to be developed to accomplish the goals that are identified. Attention should be given to the organizational needs that must be addressed in reaching the goals the union has established (more stewards, training for all mobilizers, a means of regularly communicating with the members, etc.) The union needs to identify who are its (a) constituents and allies, and (b) the targets of the actions the union will take to implement its plan. In the first category are the people who are the body of the union, such as the members, and those people who may join in or have sympathy for the union. In the second category are the people who can make decisions that will benefit the union (such as the plant manager) and other people not directly involved but who have influence over the decision-makers (such as investors).
Finally the union needs to identify tactics that it can use to implement its plan. Common tactics for unions have been strikes and grievances, but others exist, such as press releases and conferences petitions, shareholder resolutions, etc. Generally, the tactics component is the easiest and most enjoyable part of developing a plan. And while no plan will function without tactics, it is a mistake for the union to focus on tactics until after it has gone though the other parts of the planning process, for tactics by themselves will not result in improvements unless the union has identified what its objectives are in mounting a sustained, proactive campaign.
Think of Your Union as an Animal. If You Had to Describe it as an Animal, What Kind Would it Be?
What Is the Primary Reason That the Company Bargains with the Union?
What Is the Greatest Strength of the Union?
What Is the Greatest Weakness of the Union?
What Is the Biggest Threat to the Security of the Union?
What Would You Say Is the Prevailing Opinion of the Community about Unions? About Your Union?
What Is the Greatest Strength of the Company?
What Is the Greatest Weakness of the Company?
Next summer Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships and seized 300 Argive Citizens who were still suspected of being pro-Spartan. These were put by the Athenians into the nearby islands under Athenian control.
The Athenians also made an expedition against the island of Melis. They had thirty of their own ships, six from Chios, and two from Lesbos; 1,200 hoplites, 300 archers, and twenty mounted archers, all from Athens; and about 1,500 hoplites from the allies and the islanders.
The Mehans are a colony from Sparta. They had refused to join the Athenian empire like the other islanders, and at first had remained neutral without helping either side; but afterwards, when the Athenians had brought force to bear on them by laying waste their land, they had become open enemies of Athens.
Now the generals Cleomedes, the son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, the son of Tisimachus, encamped with the above force in Melian territory and, before doing any harm to the land, first of all sent representatives to negotiate. The Melians did not invite these representatives to speak before the people, but asked them to make the statement for which they had come in front of the governing body and the few. The Athenian representatives then spoke as follows:
The Council of the Melians replied as follows:
The Athenians then withdrew from the discussion. The Mehans, left to themselves, reached a conclusion which was much the same as they had indicated in their previous replies. Their answer was as follows:
The Mehans made this reply, and the Athenians, just as they were breaking off the discussion, said:
The Athenian representatives then went back to the army, and the Athenian generals, finding that the Mehans would not submit immediately commenced hostilities and built a wall completely round the city of Melos, dividing the work out among the various states. Later they left behind a garrison of some of their own and some allied troops to blockade the place by land and sea, and with the greater part of their army returned home. The force left behind stayed on and continued with the siege.
About the same time the Argives invaded Phliasia and were ambushed by the Phliasians and the exiles from Argos, losing about eighty men.
Then too, the Athenians at Pylos captured a great quantity of plunder from Spartan territory. Not seven after this did the Spartans renounce the treaty and make war, but they issued a proclamation saying that any of their people who wished to do so were free to make raids on the Athenians. The Corinthians also made some attacks on the Athenians because of private quarrels of their own, but the rest of the Peloponnesians stayed quiet.
Meanwhile the Melians made a night attack and captured the part of the Athenian lines opposite the market place. They killed some of the troops, and then, after bringing in corn and everything else useful that they could lay their hands on, retired again and made no further move, while the Athenians took measures to make their blockade more efficient in future. So the summer came to an end.
In the following winter the Spartans planned to invade the territory of Argos, but when the sacrifices for crossing the frontier turned out unfavorably, they gave up the expedition. The fact that they had intended to invade made the Argives suspect certain people in their city, some of whom they arrested, though others succeeded in escaping.
About this same time the Melians again captured another part of the Athenian lines where there were only a few of the garrison on guard. As a result of this, another force came out afterwards from Athens under the command of Philocrates, the son of Demeas. Siege operations were now carried on vigorously and, as there was also some treachery from inside, the Melians surrendered unconditionally to the Athenians, who put to death all the men of military age whom they took, and sold the women and children as slaves. Melos itself they took over for themselves, sending out later a colony of 500 men.
The nature and composition of the two teams that meet at the bargaining table are fundamentally different. Because of these differences, the union team must face and deal with problems that do not exist for its employer counterpart. While there will be differences in the opinions and positions of the various members of the employer team, those differences will not normally constitute a fundamental problem for the leader of the employer team since someone in management - whether the spokesperson at the table, general manager or chief executive officer - usually has the power and authority to resolve those differences and impose effective unanimity on the team members.
The situation is dramatically different for the union team. Even the most autocratic of unions is, after all, a political organization and the final decision of the union team - to agree on a given contract is usually subject to the vote and ratification of the entire membership. Even apart from ratification, the union team must be democratic in the ultimate sense that it speaks for the membership. As will be demonstrated, only its real representational nature gives the union team any real power.
Since every union team must face this ultimate test of ratification, it is quite natural that many unions attempt to prepare for ratification by taking care to see that every major faction and block of members with the local have representation at the bargaining table. This is a course fraught with dangers and we are going to discuss the safe navigation of those dangers.
Let us start with several axioms; propositions so self-evidently true that they require neither proof nor discussion:
The goal of the union team is to negotiate the best possible wages, hours, and working conditions and to assure the continuing unity and health of the union.
The effectiveness of the union team in achieving its goals will be largely determined by the degree to which its positions at the table are supported by a determined, militant and unified membership. Stated another way, management is far more apt to accede to a union demand if it knows that the union team's position is supported by a large majority of members who might well be willing to strike if that particular demand does not prevail. Stated yet another way, and more generally, management should have no doubt that the union team is the representative (in fact as well as in theory) of its workers and that if it reaches agreement with the team, it will have peace and productivity ... and if it doesn't, it will have war. Not necessarily or only a strike; perhaps just discontent, turnover and lower productivity - loose bolts as it is occasionally called.
- The ultimate welfare and selfish interest of every individual member is best served - a unified, informed, and determined membership is best achieved - through members who understand that they must sometimes sacrifice personal goals for group goals. [Of course, this might not be true in the case of a union member who thinks, perhaps correctly, that betrayal of the union might be rewarded with a foreman's job ... but this and other exceptions only serve to prove the rule: An educated, informed membership is a militant and united membership.]
We think that these three axioms contain the essence of what must be known and understood for the practice of effective trade unionism including the successful negotiation of a contract. The truth is that the successful negotiation of the labor contract, from the union's point of view, depends far more on the unity and determination of the bargaining unit than on the skill of the negotiator. The most competent and accomplished negotiator in the land is not going "to wheedle" much of a contract out of management, not matter how glib his/her tongue, impeccable his/her logic, or persuasive his/her arguments, if- the local union is tom by dissention; the skilled craftspeople are concerned only with out-of-class work; the older members worry only about retirement and the younger members concerned only with a wage increase- and the lot of them are suspicious of the union and make it plain that "no union boss is going to tell me to strike." If the reverse is true (i.e., the local is truly united and there is effective concern for the welfare of one's union brothers and sisters), then even a relatively inexperienced negotiator is apt to look like a hero.
There has been an extraordinary amount of nonsense written lately about the techniques and tricks of negotiation but there is no magical way to persuade management to say "yes." Management will generally act in what it perceives to be its own self-interest. The truth is that the prostitute on the street comer knows approximately fifty percent of everything there is to know about negotiations: "Give me your money and it's going to feel good." The job of the union negotiator is to translate these crudities into acceptable bargaining table language: "A fair contract will mean reduced turnover, the attraction and retention of more competent and qualified workers, higher morale and increased productivity and, therefore, lower costs for management." Conversely, failure to agree on a fair contract will mean, if not a strike, at the minimum the reverse of all these things and, thus, higher costs for management.
Therefore, it becomes immediately apparent that when the local union prepares to go to the bargaining table what it needs is not bargaining tricks and tactics but a unified membership with tell understood and common goals and a tightly knit bargaining team that understands and is committed to those goals.
Every local union will have - either proscribed by constitution, by-laws or established in practice - a process for the selection of a negotiation committee. Election, lamentably, is perhaps the worst way to select a team. In the first place, the wrong people are likely to be elected. In a local with twenty percent female membership, for instance, it is entirely possible that the election process would produce a team composed exclusively of men. Members of the committee might be: elected by department or at large; appointed by the president; or members by virtue of their union office.
Frequently the committee will be composed of certain elected officers plus some additional members who may be elected from the local at large or by departments or shifts.
Regardless of the system for the selection of the negotiating committee that exists within a given local, we suggest that what is needed is a "negotiating team" and a "negotiating committee." Well in advance - several months in advance is not too early - the negotiations team and the negotiations committee should be in place and beginning their work. If the local union has a "negotiations committee," that committee is often designated as the negotiations team that is to bargain with management. If the committee does not meet the criterion of having at least one person to whom every member can relate, then an appropriate number of additional team members, carefully chosen to achieve the proper balance, can be added to be the team and a separate negotiations committee (to handle communications) can be selected. On the other hand, if the existing negotiations committee is too large to constitute the "team," then the committee can be divided to perform the two separate functions.
Perhaps the most practical way for dealing with the problem is to create (through electing and/or appointment) a very large negotiations committee. Then, to divide that committee into a small team to do the bargaining at the table and a larger "negotiations committee" charged with the responsibilities of surveying, educating, and informing the membership.
The terminology of the team vs. the committee is not important but the functions are. The "negotiations committee", as we define it, is essentially a communications link between the negotiations team and the membership and it is essential that communications flow in both directions. The function of the committee is to determine the priority demands of the membership and to relay that information to the team and to keep the membership informed on progress and problems at the table. Whereas the size of the team must be kept as small as possible, there are no such constraints on the size of the committee. It may be as large as necessary so that members of the committee can, particularly in emergencies, quickly communicate on a one-to-one basis with every member of the local. One of the jobs of the committee will be to organize every member of the local into a "communications tree" so that virtually instantaneous communications can be achieved with the entire membership. Ideally, there should be a communications committee member - or, in some cases of large locals, at least a "subcommittee" member - for every ten to fifteen members.
In practice this means that for every local union of one hundred members or larger, a negotiating committee of ten members should be established under the leadership of a committee chairperson or leader. The entire membership would then be divided into approximately equal groups and assigned to a committee member who, in turn, organizes a subcommittee consisting of one member for each ten to fifteen members for whom the committee member was responsible. For larger locals, the number of members on the negotiating committee increases.
The initial function of the negotiations committee is to explain to the entire membership the negotiation process and the procedure through which the contract goals are to be transmitted to the team. Its next task is to collect and prioritize - through a survey of the entire membership - the contract goals of the membership. Then, throughout the course of negotiations up to and including the ratification process, it serves as the communication link between team and members. The team needs to be kept continually posted on the mood of the membership and developments at the workplace; in turn, the membership, if it is to be kept active and involved, must be kept informed on the progress, or lack of progress, at the table.
The responsibilities of the negotiating committee are somewhat hard to define and, without question, hard to accomplish. Methods will have to be adapted to fit the needs of a given local union but, in general, the job of the negotiating committee is to:
Meet together as a group and spend some time, not as much as the negotiating team learning and practicing communication skills.
Select a committee chairperson who convenes and presides at meetings of the committee. In addition, there should be some single person, not necessarily the chairperson, to serve as liaison with the team.
Spend at least eight hours in a single session if possible, but two or three if necessary, familiarizing every member of the committee with the Negotiations Workshop material. As many committee members as possible should be given the opportunity to serve as workshop leader in dry run practice sessions with the committee.
The sample membership survey form in the Workshop material should be revised, in consultation with local officers and the negotiating team, to adapt it to the particular local union.
Contract survey forms should be distributed by committee members and stewards, personally if possible, to all members of the local union and a record kept of the members who return the survey form.
A subcommittee should be appointed to revise and adapt, in consultation with local officers and the negotiating team, all of the material in the Negotiations Workshop.
Committee members should schedule as many ninety-minute negotiations workshops as needed and, if possible, to accommodate all members who are willing to attend. It is reasonable to expect as many as fifty percent of the membership to attend a workshop if it is properly advertised and promoted and if it is conducted at a convenient time and place. In most cases, immediately after work is the ideal time and a comfortable place near the work site is an ideal place. Attendance at any single workshop should be limited to about twenty. The workshop is designed to be conducted by a single committee member but it can also be conducted by a team of two-to-four members with the advantage that the members lend each other support.
A communications tree should be established for the local so that a message can be transmitted to every member of the local by each committee member calling four-to-seven members who in turn pass the message on to four-to- seven other members. Additional levels can be established if needed in very large locals. The beginning of the formation of the tree commences as one of the activities of the negotiations workshop. Since all members will not attend a workshop, some additional work will have to be done to make certain that every member of the local is plugged in at some point. Care should be taken to make certain that conscientious and reliable members form the "trunk7' with weak or unreliable members located at the tips of branches so that they do not have the responsibility of passing messages on.
One of the first uses of the completed tree should be to survey the entire membership to find out which members have not returned their contract survey forms and to urge them to do so. Where members have lost the forms, they should be supplied another form and a commitment obtained for the return of the form at a specified time. Both the existence of the communications tree and the emphasis of the importance of every member completing the survey form will give the membership a valuable sense of involvement and will let them know that their opinion counts.
- Throughout negotiation, the telephone tree should be used as a communications safety net to make certain that every member is kept informed about the progress of negotiations and is aware of meeting times and places, as well as such activities as "Button Day" or "T-shirt Day" designed to demonstrate the unity and strength of the local. However, committee members should not rely exclusively on the tree but should make an effort to speak personally with each member in his/her group as often as possible. During these personal contacts the operations of the tree should be checked and malfunctions corrected. In a local of six hundred members, for instance, there might be a negotiations committee of twenty with each committee member passing messages to five people who in turn pass it on to five people. This would mean that each Committee member's "branch" would number thirty people, besides him/herself, and s/he should cultivate personal communications with all thirty and particularly with the five people to whom s/he passes messages. In addition, s/he should encourage those five to stay in personal contact with the five people to whom they pass messages. Friendly rivalries - for highest participation in attending meetings, returning survey forms, wearing buttons, etc. - between the twenty branches can be helpful.
Membership on the team, because of the mystique and drama associated with "negotiating", is apt to be more sought after than membership of the committee. The work of a team members is however, somewhat paradoxically, stressful and boring and not too many people are temperamentally suited to the job. The negotiations committee member, on the other hand is far freer to work at his/her own pace and in his/her own style and to make a contribution that is far likelier to be more personally rewarding.
The preparation of the negotiations committee will be considerably different from that of the team since the committee members will be doing most of their work individually and not as part of a team or committee.
It has been the experience of the authors that if the members of a local union truly understand that the effectiveness of their bargaining team depends on their own unity and support for the team's position, they will almost always respond by behaving in their own self-interest. And if they understand the bargaining process itself, they will understand that they must set their contract negotiations goals high (but not unrealistically or absurdly high) but in the end, probably have to accept something less.
Hence, it is the first task of the negotiating committee members to understand the simple principles embodied in the axioms on page one. Their next job should be to impart that same information and understanding to every member of the local union. Union-busting management consultants have found that the most effective way to do their job is to have it done by first level supervisors on a one- to-one basis. Oral communications on a one-to-one basis, they have found, is far more effective than newspapers, letters, or meetings.
The job of communicating with every member of a local on a one-to-one basis may, at first, seem an impossible task but it's really easy enough if it is divided among enough people. A telephone or communications tree is an ideal way to make the division because the tree can be used for almost instantaneous, inexpensive, and reasonable confidential communication with every member throughout negotiations and, particularly, during a strike (should there be one).
Perhaps the simplest way to form the tree is to divide the entire membership among the members of the negotiations committee so that all members are responsible for approximately equal numbers of members. Each committee member should then recruit one subcommittee member for each ten to fifteen members in his/her bloc. Once the tree is in place, it should be tested and regularly used to be certain that it is kept working properly. Most members will be eager to cooperate since it is obvious that truly vital information could come to them at any time through the tree.
One of the early tasks of the negotiating committee will be to survey the entire membership to find out which contract issues are most important to most members. Participation in the survey will raise the consciousness of the membership and involve them actively in the bargaining process. A request that they prioritize their contract demands will subtly prepare them for the certainty that the bargaining team is not going to be able to get everything on everybody's list.
During the actual negotiations, the primary functions of the negotiations committee are to: keep the team constantly informed of morale and developments in the workplace (Are supervisors spreading rumors? What are they?); constantly remind the membership to give management evidence of their support for their team (through the wearing of buttons, attendance at meetings, recruitment of new members, writing letters, etc.), and keeping the membership informed on progress at the table. The committee, of course, will be limited in the news that it can give the membership to what it is given by the team.
In addition to passing on available information, it must repeatedly explain to the membership that there are no secrets among several hundred people and that it is crucial that the team not release so much information to tip off management as to its tactics or strategy.
The job of what we will call the "team" is to meet management at the table and engage in the actual negotiations. It should have a "spokesperson" or "chief negotiator" and might in addition also have a "chairperson' or "captain." Other roles played by one or more of the team include "note taker", "research", "communicator", etc. The spokesperson/chief negotiator speaks for the team at the table or, on occasion, directs other team members to speak on specific topics. The captain/chairperson handles the administration of the team's business and speaks for the team - or perhaps directs the spokesperson or other team members to speak - when it meets with the membership. The spokesperson should be chosen on the basis of skill and experience in negotiations. S/he may not be a paid professional and is not always a member of the bargaining unit. There are advantages and disadvantages to the use of a professional in this role and we will discuss these arguments elsewhere. The team captain should be a political selection. Ideally s/he should be the person who commands great confidence and respect within the membership and among the team.
Every member of the team should understand that, even though s/he may even have been elected by a particular department or job classification, as a bargaining team member s/he represents no particular department or group of members but rather represents the entire membership. This is crucially important, and the entire membership must understand it. The bargaining team should be constituted so that every member of the local can look at the team and feel secure that at least one person on that team understands the particular problems or goals of the member's department, job classification, or faction. This condition must be satisfied without making the team so large as to be unwieldy. It should emphatically be a team and not a committee. Bear in mind the classical definition of a camel: "A horse designed by a committee."
All members of the team should be able to agree on the following ground rules:
It is the responsibility of the team and of each member to represent the membership, to accomplish the greatest good for the greatest number.
The team will attempt to reach all decisions by consensus and will be careful to give every member the opportunity to be heard but, when consensus is impossible, decisions will be made by majority vote and each member will support the decision of the majority as if it were a consensus.
All discussions within the team and at the negotiations table will be held confidential and released only be decision of the team through a designated spokesperson.
All members will publicly support the recommendation of the team to the membership and will refrain from criticizing specific elements of the agreement.
- Each member will accept personal responsibility for the success of the team and will refrain from divisive criticism of the team or any of his fellow members.
The job of the team is to:
Spend some time, the equivalent of two full days at the minimum, learning to function cooperatively as a team.
Draft specific contract demands reflecting the needs of the local as revealed through the judgment of the leadership, the survey of the membership, the grievance file, the advice of the international or regional union office, and recent contract settlements in the area and in the industry.
Utilize all available resources to learn as much as possible about the financial condition and plans of the employer.
Assign specific jobs to all members of the team. Chief negotiator, team captain, secretary, and bargaining book custodian are some obvious jobs and, in addition, subcommittees may be created to research and develop expertise in specific areas such as the incentive system, health care, safety, and pensions. The secretary keeps for the union's exclusive use a summary of dialogue at the table while the bargaining book custodian keeps and organizes in a large loose-leaf binder copies of all of the proposals and documents that pass across the table. Each document should be carefully identified and dated. One section of the book should contain copies of the secretary's notes.
Meet with the company team and negotiate the best possible contract.
- Carefully plan the membership meeting to ratify or reject the final contract. It is the team's responsibility to make a unanimous recommendation to the membership.
While the goal of the team will be to act always by consensus (indeed that should even be the goal, rarely attainable, of the local union itself, votes are by their nature divisive), reality must be faced and it is therefore a common rule to have the team composed of an odd number of members. Depending on the diversity of the local, three members might well suffice for most small locals. Five is usually a satisfactory number for locals smaller than 1,000 members and sever or nine is, in practice, about as large as a team can get and truly be a team. To some extent the question of size is secondary to the question of whether they can behave with unity.
Ordinarily a team should have met together to develop and practice its skills for the equivalent of several days before it begins to cope with its real job: Negotiations. By this point it will be useful if the team has selected or agreed to the appointment of a team chairperson and a spokesperson/chief negotiator and agreed to some ground rules that ideally should include the following:
An effort will be made to reach all team decisions by consensus but should a vote become necessary, every team member will support the decision of the team even if s/he votes on the losing side.
- No statements about negotiations will be made or released until they have been discussed and approved by the team or, when this may not be practical, by the chairperson and spokesperson.
As the team begins the job of preparing for actual negotiations, the chairperson should take care that each team member has meaningful assignments. Each member may, for instance, be assigned the responsibility of becoming the team's expert on a particular contract area - wages, fringes, retirement, health, grievance machinery, etc.
While the bulk and most important work of negotiations -- the organization, involvement and mobilization of the membership -- takes place away from the negotiations table both before and during negotiations, the "glamour" job is that of the chief negotiator or, as it is increasingly being called, "spokesperson." While the unity and determinations of the union membership is far and away more important than the skill of the chief negotiator in shaping and determining the contents of the final package, the union's chief negotiator is without question the most important single individual in the negotiation process.
It is precisely the transcendental importance of the job that sometimes excites the political jealousies and egos of elected local union leaders leading them to downgrade the title to that of "spokesperson." A mistake, we think. It is important that management understand that they are dealing with the knowledgeable representative of the entire membership with the authority to make meaningful commitments, promises and, sometimes, even threats on behalf of that membership. Unions insist, legally and rightly, that management send to the table a negotiator "cloaked with sufficient authority" to negotiate. The union's representative must at least equally command management's respect and must be seen by them as an authority figure. The title of "Chief Negotiator" conveys that message more effectively than that of mere "spokesperson."
There are at least five distinct choices for the position of chief negotiator. Some unions have the option to make that choice prior to negotiations, while in other unions, the choice is mandated by the union constitution or by-laws. Regardless of the method used, it is important for negotiating committees to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each choice. The five alternatives are:
The local union president who is an employee in the bargaining unit. In most cases the president will be the person who has the greatest support and trust among the membership. The president often is very knowledgeable of the strengths and weaknesses of the present contract and workplace issues. The downside of having the president as chief negotiator, while they may not be obvious can outweigh the advantages. Communications to and from the membership is a job that the president may be the one person uniquely qualified to handle. The president may also be the person best suited to developing support among the negotiating team for the negotiated contract but this is difficult if the president is also the negotiator. In addition, the other responsibilities of the president are often time consuming and make it difficult for the president to serve both in his or her elected office and serve as chief negotiator.
A Negotiations Chairperson or some other elected or appointed officer of the union. Like the president, this person may be assumed to have the support of the membership and this choice enhances local union democracy. Like the president, this person may often have little experience in negotiations and may be viewed as just a "worker" who "doesn't know any more about negotiations that I do." It may be difficult for this person to place personal workplace problems and goals in proper perspective and act in the interests of the entire membership. Conversely, he may be so careful to avoid showing undue care for their own situation that they bend over backward to avoid any appearance of self-interest.
An International representative or other union staffer. Even new reps are likely to have more experience and confidence in negotiations than a member of the bargaining unit. In addition, their vested interest is in the continuing success of the union as a whole, rather than in a particular unit or department. Staff reps do not set at the table negotiating against someone who is his or her "boss" and therefore are in a better position to maintain the equality of the union at the table. Their services are free to the local union. However, the staff rep may not be familiar with either the workplace problems or familiar to the membership. The press of other duties may be a distraction and may limit his or her time making it more difficult to give the attention and the patience needed to get the best settlement possible.
A hired gun, such as an outside lawyer or consultant. If the union does as good job in selection, then an outsider can bring much experience and skill to the table. The outsider will also be under more direct control of the local than an international representative. However, there may be a lack of familiarity with workplace problems (and language) and there certainly will be a cost to the local. A lawyer will also have a tendency to write contract language in legalese despite the fact that clear and simple English is just as legal and binding.
- The local union president (or other officer) who is a full time, elected union officer paid by the union rather than management. This is a hybrid of the first two options and has the advantage of being a person whose future more likely depends on the union rather than on the company.
However chosen, the chief negotiator will learn the tricks of the trade primarily through observation of and interaction with other negotiators. Most negotiators in time tend to share certain common talents and skills. If there is a single most important trait in a negotiator it is a flexibility (which does not mean a lack of conviction or weakness). Tactics effective in one situation may fail totally in another very similar situation and no negotiator should attempt to blindly follow any simple set of "rules" such as the ones included in this workbook. In addition, each negotiator will inevitably develop his or her own "style" and no one should attempt to adopt any suggestion or follow any rules with which they cannot feel comfortable.
Below are some of the roles and qualities we have identified in a good union negotiator. Read through the list and then, as a group, prioritize the importance of the six listed areas for negotiators. You should be prepared to explain what struck you as important (or unimportant) about each of the listed areas.
However a chief negotiator is chosen (see "The Choice of Negotiator"), s/he will learn the tricks of the trade primarily through observation of and interaction with other negotiators. Most chief negotiators in time tend to share certain talents and skills. If there is a single most important train in a negotiator it is flexibility (which does not mean a lack of conviction or weakness). Tactics effective in one situation may fail totally in another very similar situation and no negotiator should attempt to blindly follow any simple set of "rules" such as the ones included in this workbook. IN addition, each negotiator will inevitably develop his or her own "style" and no one should attempt to adopt any suggestion or follow any rule with which they cannot feel comfortable.
Perhaps the main job of the negotiator before beginning negotiations is to assess the unity, strength, expectations, and determination of the membership. Next in importance is the degree of support and trust that s/he can expect from other members of the negotiating team. It is the chief negotiator's assessment of the understanding and loyalty of the negotiator's team that will have a major impact on the negotiator's style and tactics at the table. Except in the rarest of circumstances, the assessment will reveal problems and many will be the problems about which the negotiator can do nothing. But they must be taken into account.
An early and continuing task of the negotiator will be to assert and maintain the equality of the union side of the table. Toward this end, you should normally hold meetings on neutral turf rather than in the employer's conference room (where management is clearly in charge of nearly everything, including the temperature and the copying machine). One problem that may prevent even the semblance of equality is the natural tendency of the management team, ordinarily the "bosses," to call the union members by their first names while the union negotiators, ordinarily the "employees," just as naturally tend to call the management negotiators "Mister". A way to establish equity early on is to suggest: " We're going to be spending a lot of time together the next few weeks and we should be as relaxed and comfortable as possible. It's certainly a minor point but what form of address would you prefer? First names? Or would you prefer to be more formal?"
The chief negotiator should also politely but firmly insist that all questions be directed to him or her and no one on the union side should speak except by invitation of the chief negotiator. The importance of this rule, which is not merely a tactic but rather a fundamental of union strategy, cannot be overstated. Between the natural tendency of many union members to "speak their piece" and the temptations with which management will bait union committee members, this discipline is more than smart table manners. It is constant evidence that management is dealing with a union, not with a crowd or a mob of individuals.
One of the reasons that committee members break discipline and speak out of turn is that they get bored with the process of negotiations. The actual configuration of the bargaining table contributes to this boredom. When committees are too big, members on the ends of the table often feel left out. The typical seating arrangement at the table is for the two chief negotiators, flanked on either side by the committee members, to face each other from the opposite sides of a large rectangular table. This enables the two negotiators to negotiate in a manner that often results in the members at the end of the table having trouble following the discussion. Simply placing the two chief negotiators at opposite ends of the table with their members flanking them at the sides of the table will assure that they speak loudly enough for everyone at the table to hear. And, psychologically, the committee members will tend to feel included rather than excluded form the discussions.
An important consideration for the chief negotiator is to maintain the trust and support of the negotiating committee. Clearly, this is most important in distinguishing between solo and secret negotiations. There are a number of situations where solo negotiations is required: when one local deals with a number of small employers, when a pattern has been set and the union official is getting other employers to "sign up," or during the course of negotiations it becomes important to meet in an informal setting to get a feel for where the bottom fine may lie. However, it is crucial to draw the distinction between negotiating privately and negotiating secretly. Few things can destroy the cohesion of a negotiating committee (and the membership, by extension) than a negotiator who enters into secret negotiations.
While secret negotiations imply a "sell-out," private negotiations between the chief negotiators can and does work to achieve agreement. The reality is that in negotiations, once an offer is made at the table it effectively represents a new "bottom line" for the side that is floating the proposal. This is one of the big reasons that progress is often so frustratingly slow at the table. Both sides are reluctant to explore possible compromises since by making the offer, they have effectively changed their official position. Private meetings provide the venue by which the parties can search for and discover mutually acceptable compromises. Such private meetings, if conducted in secret, are certain to arouse suspicions and distrust. But there is seldom any need for them to be kept secret. If the union negotiator levels with the committee members and asks if a meeting should be sought or agreed to they will most often agree, especially if the suggestion comes at a difficult point in the negotiations.
Management often begins negotiations by making an opening statement outlining the bleak financial condition of the company and warning that any increases in costs may send the company down the tubes. It is probably just as well to sympathize with and profess understanding of management's plight and suggest that under the circumstances it is even more urgent that the parties move quickly to reach an agreement on a fair and equitable contract since the tensions and uncertainties of a long and drawn out negotiations are destructive of morale and disruptive to productivity.
The union may even use its own opening statement to suggest that because of the urgency of the situation the union has trimmed its demands to the bare minimum so as to not waste everyone's time in haggling and horse trading. The union can request that management make some suggestions about wage and benefit increases, but unless management is after some concession, they generally refuse to make any offer. However, there is no harm in asking and there are the rare occasions when management is willing to grant more in isolated areas than the union had contemplated asking. This puts the union in the position of agreeing to a management demand and, if you are creative, using that agreement to lever a little bit more out of management as the price they pay for your agreeing.
In negotiations, patience is a virtue. The chief negotiator should strive to be perceived by the opposite side of the table as a reasonable and patient person who understands their problems and whose chief interest is in reaching a fair and equitable settlement. Pressure and threats should come from a determined membership, not form the chief negotiator. And if threats do become necessary they should be delivered in sadness rather than anger.
Negotiations is at least as much an art as it is a science. While there are facts to learn and skills to practice, there is a portion of the negotiations trade that seems to come naturally to some and to escape others indefinitely. This refers, of course, to the art of timing.
Everyone knows when they see it and nowhere is there a better example as in watching a great comic. The same words, sometimes even the same gestures, delivered by a competent comedian which evokes a belly laugh from the audience when delivered by someone less sensitive to the nuance of timing may be responded to by a groan or a snicker. This aspect of the art of timing is so personal a talent that its characteristics and processes are difficult to describe and define.
But there is another element of timing that can be developed as a conscious part of strategy. First it needs to be noted that no major concession would ever be made without some terminal point to the negotiations. Frequently this is the contract termination or strike deadline, which is why so many negotiations are settled so short a time before the "final hour." That "hour" may be a given but the negotiator can and must create other deadlines to keep things moving. The calling of a meeting to which one must report is a self imposed and somewhat arbitrary deadlines. There are others.
Job actions are a critical part of the negotiations that it is worth noting that the timing of such action is a basic part of negotiations strategy. For this reason even though someone in the union must be designated as the strike captain, the timing of calling (and calling off) of membership mobilization activities must be ultimately the responsibility of the chief negotiator.
In order to slow down negotiations (management seemed too eager to get to impasse and impose certain contract cuts) one negotiator had his doctor check him into the hospital for extensive test to his heart and nerves. It was impossible for management's public image that it insist on the union continuing to meet until its chief negotiator's fate was known. Conversely, another local scheduled a date on which its national president would join the bargaining - a president whose reputation for abusive tactics was so well known that management had an incentive to settle with the more moderate local leaders. The negotiator must search the calendar of public events that may be used as bargaining levers. Is there a stockholders meeting? Is the legislative session about to begin or end? Has their negotiator scheduled a delayed vacation trip for a time when the negotiations were presumed to have been completed?
There is another aspect to timing that merits attention. That is the use and abuse of all night, round the clock marathon sessions. These sessions catch the public's attention with the media coverage of the "36 hour, non-stop bargaining," which led to the agreement. Some very sophisticated union negotiators enjoy telling war stories about how they put something over on management in the middle of the night. But the magic of the marathon session is mostly myth and there are dangers. Frequently, members of the committee are required to keep up with their regular work. In addition, they seldom are used to the pressures of the bargaining table and are subject to great stress. The potential advantages to the union must be weighted against the cost of wearing out the union committee.
Caucuses are usually abused. Flurries of note passing and caucuses by the union signal management that no one is really in charge and that they are dealing with a collection if individuals rather than a team. Note passing is best kept to a minimum and each member of the union team should have a reliably secret signal to alert the chief negotiator that a caucus is needed. Every union caucus can then appear to be called by the chief negotiator and the impression given that there is no dissension or faulty communications among the members of the union team. The excessive use of the caucus by the union is often a symptom of lack of trust, poor communications, or other weaknesses of the union team.
Every request for a caucus as well as the length of the caucus will send a message to management and thought and care should be taken to make certain that the message received is the one you intended to send. If management, for instance, should make the unexpected and rather attractive offer to agree to an 8% across the board increase in exchange for a group of union proposals - for varying cents per hour increases, an additional holiday and longevity pay - might well require a caucus but the way it is requested might be critical.
If the union's chief negotiator simply said, "give us a few minutes," management would likely and logically conclude that the union found the proposal attractive and that the union was not irrevocably wedded to the notions of wage adjustments and longevity pay. A different and usually preferable message would be sent if the response of the union negotiator was: " No, that's not acceptable but it does represent some movement. Give us a few minutes and let me see if we can come up with a counterproposal that might meet both our needs."
A common mistake union teams make is the failure to take advantage of management caucus. If management is putting together a new proposal, the union should be busy anticipating the proposal and deciding in advance the proper responses to the various proposals considered the most likely.
There may be times when a caucus is wanted for no other reason that R & R and it can be advantageous to play cards (or take a nap) while management tries vainly to figure out what in the world you are considering. As with other disingenuous tricks, it can be a two-edged sword and this is not to recommend such a tactic, but rather to illustrate the variety of uses to which a caucus may be put.
It is during the final hours of settlement that the chief negotiator needs all of the imagination, calculation and team support possible. To wrap up the deal he or she may need to move quickly - usually without a caucus - to "adjust the package." Management, of course, is concerned with all the economic elements of the contract but frequently they are more concerned with the total cost over the life of contract of all wage and benefit increases. By delaying increases to later in the contract it is naturally possible to reduce the total cost of the package but at the same time establish wage levels or new benefits that will, hopefully, continue indefinitely in future contract. Increases to be effective in the final months of the contract may cost the employer little but may represent an important "foot in the door" for the union.
The range of management negotiators runs from paternalistic owners of profitable businesses to ideologues who would never agree to "compulsory" unionism. The most likely adversary, however, will be the professional negotiator who is usually difficult but seldom impossible. Their assignment is to reach an agreement and they will try to do it. They usually come into negotiations with instructions to make a settlement within predetermined parameters. Unfortunately those parameters are established within the comfortable confines of the president's office or the boardroom rather than under the pressures of the negotiations table. One can only hope that the company negotiator will be a person with some confidence and flexibility or with sufficient stature or persuasive ability to have the parameters modified. Otherwise a strike may be preordained and inevitable. The realistic potential of a strike is such a professional representative's major lever in inducing a change in top management's "parameters" - that is their realistic consideration of how far they will really go to avoid or settle a strike.
Part of the planning for negotiations is imagining what we would do if we were them. For example, how do you handle this classic management stratagem?
Many management professional negotiators like to play the "good guy" role. Such a negotiator emphasizes his or her commitment to the integrity of the collective bargaining process, sympathizes with the plight of the workers, has empathy for the enormous task confronting the union negotiating team, respects the union's chief negotiator, etc. This "good guy" will frequently report the hostile attitude of the "big bosses," their eager anticipation of a confrontation with the union, the tight rein under which s/he is held. Such a negotiator seldom says "no." Rather, "It's not in the cards," "I'd get my head handed to me if I even suggested something as extreme as what you're proposing," etc. At critical moments, usually near the end of negotiations, the "good guy" offers to become the union negotiator's agent. S/he volunteers to "try to get a little movement on this one" and, if "successful," reports back that s/he stuck his/her neck out for you. The result is obvious - you now owe him or her a favor- and certainly don't want to jeopardize his/her job because then the "bad guys" would come to the force.
While this tactic may not move the experienced union negotiator it is often amazingly effective with the union bargaining team. The way to protect the union from such blatant manipulation of the naivete of members of your team is to overcome the naivete with information. If you have explained this you will have inoculate your team against the temptation to be taken in by Mr. Nice Guy.
It is well to remember that "bargaining " is simply a euphemism for the earthier and better understood "haggling and horse trading" from our history. The concept of "fixed prices" had its origin with the Quaker shopkeepers of Philadelphia. These were persons of such stringent integrity that they held it a "lie" to ask more for a product that they were willing to accept and felt morally compelled to break with the ancient and almost universal practice of asking more than they expected to get and then haggling about the final price. Shoppers found the concept of fixed prices such a relief and convenience that they flocked to the Quaker shopkeepers who found their morality unexpectedly financially rewarding and went on to establish the predecessors of the great department stores of today.
Perhaps some equally moral union negotiator may someday find some bold and innovative way to apply the same concept to the process of collective bargaining, but we haven't seen that day arrive yet. In the meantime it may be that there are some union members and officers of such unbending honesty that they are simply not fitted for the real world posturing and game playing of the negotiations table. They must leave the field for others.
The negotiating table is much like a poker table - only infinitely more complicated. As at the poker table, there is concealment and posturing but despite the posturing the effective negotiator will normally develop a surprising degree of trust with his or her counterpart on the other side of the table. The negotiator's word when given should be honored and there is seldom anything to be gained through dishonesty. Like in poker, the negotiator may bluff or dissimulate in the play of the cards. However, there are rules of play and some IOU's that the professional poker player must scrupulously honor or be banned from the game. There are also some rules that must be honored to be continually effective.
Professional negotiators on opposing sides of the table frequently develop a surprising level of trust with the word of one to the other that is regarded as binding as a signed agreement. With that said, it is difficult to precisely define the boundary that separates permissible posturing from unacceptable dishonesty. Perhaps some examples will best illuminate that boundary. You decide if they are posturing or lying.
"Listen to me, please… I don't like to make threats and I'm certainly not threatening now. But believe me when I tell you that this contract will never be settled as long as you insist on compulsory overtime. Until you move off of that position we're wasting each other's time no matter what else we agree on. You've got my word on that"
"Look! For a dozen reasons - internal union reasons that neither important nor interesting to you - we simply cannot agree to compulsory overtime. Go along with our language on voluntary overtime and I'll guarantee you that you will have no problem in getting people to work overtime. You have my word on it!"
The union negotiator surveys the wage rates being paid by a dozen comparable employers but presents at the table only the three highest rates. Permissible? How about if the negotiator alters some of the figures?
Tentative agreements. During the course of negotiations there is language initialed that does not accurately reflect agreements reached. Since the inaccuracy seems to be to the union's benefit, you choose to "hold them to it." What if this language was not 'tentative" but rather was final and the mistake was not discovered until after the contract was signed?
Management is not likely to take your original proposals very seriously. They will assume that you do not expect to get everything or as much as you ask and their first task will be to attempt to read (through words, body language, past history, shop gossip) what your real position is. Hours will be spent in management caucus in an effort to determine with reasonable precision what you really expect to get and more importantly, what you will settle for. Serious and productive bargaining is not likely to begin until management thinks that it has accurate answers to those questions.
Therefore, demands are meaningless unless they are credible. This doesn't mean that your initial demands should be your bottom line. Rather it means that ridiculously inflated demands serve no useful purpose and that early on you should be attempting to signal to management the seriousness of your position. In reality, neither side knows its real bottom line until negotiations are well advanced and the reality therapy of an impasse leads to reassessment by each side of their own and their adversary's tolerance limit.
Every union demand should be supported by logical, rational argument but bear in mind that negotiation is not debate and winning debating points counts for nothing, indeed may be counterproductive. The goal is to persuade management to agree to your position and arguments should be used that are meaningful to management. An effort should be made to convince management that a specific union demand will actually reduce costs or at worst, minimally increase them. A wage increase will improve morale and increase efficiency. An improved pension plan will increase the job attachment of highly trained and skilled employees thus reducing the costs of turnover. A better medical plan will attract already trained and skilled new employees. Longer vacations and additional holidays will reduce absenteeism and concomitant adverse impacts on production.
In presenting the union's demands, it is not always necessary or desirable to "table" a full set of specific demands. Instead, you can go to the table with nothing in writing but a set of "problems" which you ask management to discuss with you. When you do make your demand's, management will normally seek assurances that the proposals represent the entire package and they seek a commitment that no additional demand will be made. The proper response is: " Sure. That's everything. Sign it all we'll all go celebrate with a bottle of champagne. Of course, if you are unable to agree fully with any of our proposals we naturally reserve the right to search for agreement in every way possible - including the offering of substitute proposals."
There is a natural (though unspoken and informal) quid pro quo principle in constant operation at the negotiation table. "I'll give you this if you give me that," or "I gave you that so you owe me this." Because of this fact it may be something of an advantage to portray every agreement as a concession to management. Rather than offer a union counter-proposal to an unacceptable management proposal. It is sometimes better to say that you will accept, reluctantly of course, management's proposal with some minor modifications. Like most other tactics this one can be abused to the point of ineffectiveness. "We'll accept the management proposal on wages of the 5% increase is changed to a 15% increase: is obviously so totally transparent as to be worthless.
It is frequently wise to attempt to tie several items together and attempt to dispose of all of them together. The union will accept management's position on overtime if management will meet the union halfway on speeding up the grievance process. The union will accept the company's offer on pension contributions if management will agree to an additional holiday, etc. Such "packaging" may not always be logical but is often useful.
The same gambit can be used, to a lesser degree, to reopen proposals already tentatively agreed to. Should you wish to reopen such a tentative agreement, it is sometimes possible to do so by suggesting that the union could agree to the management position on a subsequent proposal by linking it to a modification of an already tentatively agreed to item. Remember that such a tactic borders on bad faith (in a real rather than a legal sense) and it should not be used lightly and always with a clear emphasis that it is in no sense a demand but rather a suggestion offered in the hope of speeding up bargaining.
Before accepting or rejecting any management proposal, except "in principle," the union should make certain that it understands the proposal and it is seldom wise to explain management's proposal to them before they have explained it to you. Before accepting a proposal sorrowfully explain that you have no recourse but to reject the proposal but that before you do you want to make absolutely certain that you understand it. Ask direct but neutral questions. Management will then tend to explain the proposal in the most attractive terms and they can do so at no risk since you've already announced that it is being rejected. If, on the other hand, an explanation is asked after suggesting acceptance, management will instinctively fear that they "offered too much" and will try to minimize the proposal in explanation.
Avoid too hasty agreement. Once it is clear that agreement is close it is often possible to "squeeze" just a trifle more. For example, " Okay. Let's try to get on with it. We'll but the 8% if you'll agree to round all wage rates to the next highest nickel. On the other side of the coin, excessive reluctance to agree is the certain mark of the insecure and inexperienced negotiator. There comes a time when additional delay serves no purpose. Sometimes a skilled negotiator can challenge and jolt a management negotiator into movement with sudden, dramatic concessions: "It may cost em my head but if we're ever going to get this contract finished somebody has to start some movement. You want your language on overtime? You got it. Now look at our language on arbitration. Look at the proposal on union security. Give us a little movement on your part and we'll have done a good morning's work."
If the negotiator is to be able to effectively employ such a tactic it is best done as if by sudden inspiration and desperation and not immediately after a union caucus. It is therefore important that the chief negotiator of into each session armed with sufficient latitude to effect compromise and movement - which means careful briefing and discussion among the members of the union committee in advance.
The best that might be done in some cases with particularly thorny problems is to establish some sort of continuing forum for their discussion and possible resolution. A common device is a labor management committee that meets after negotiations conclude to work on solutions to the problem. While these committees have no power to impose a solution, they have the potential to continue discussion on topics of concern to the union.
Where major issues remain unsettled and unsettle able at the deadline they may be dealt with through a "reopener." A common reopener is for the purpose of determining the wage increase in the second or third year. Such a provision has the advantage of postponing the problem and in some cases (particularly where inflation is feared and it is not possible to get cost of living language) may actually be preferable to a settlement. Better, however, not to make it a "wage reopener," where the employer may demand a decrease, but rather a "reopener for a wage increase."
In addition some thought must be given to providing for impasse resolution in such reopener where you have a no-strike clause. While it is logical and arguable that wages are so central to the collective bargaining agreement that in cases where they are not settled there is no collective bargaining agreement and thus no- no strike clause, given the difficulty of mounting and winning a one-issue strike- provide for binding interest arbitration.
In most cases, the local membership will have been solicited for contract proposals and they can be both voluminous and bizarre. In an effort to make the original proposals credible many negotiators will weed out the most hopeless demands. An alternative to this weeding is to take all of the demands to the table and then at the first go round agree, even suggest, that the fringe proposals be "tabled." Once the substantive contract issues have been resolved the union negotiator can suggest: "Look, I've got a problem. I've bent to the breaking point in order to compromise and reach agreement and we've still got this pile of tabled demands. It's late and we're all tired. I promised you that these demands will not hold up agreement and they won't. But it will help us get the contract ratified and maybe keep me and other committee members from being lynched if you go through them tonight and see what you can do. It's a difficult position to argue with and sometimes a few crumbs will be picked up. In addition some additional members will see their concerns attended to in the bargaining process.
Prepare for Collective Bargaining with Power and Planning
When it's time to negotiate a contract, do you take what you get or get what you take? A contract is the product of two things - power and plannin2. By negotiation time, it is too late to do much to change the power relationship between union and management. All the more reason for careful planning and preparation, including a careful assessment of that power relationship. Start to plan six months beforehand. The teams (allies or competitors?) are already on the field. What are some of the things that you should be thinking about?
We must analyze our bargaining power. How strong are we numerically? How many belong and pay dues? Of the dues-payers, how many are truly good members? How united are we? How militant is the membership? Are special education programs and meetings needed before we get into negotiations? How is our strength distributed throughout the unit? Are some departments or agencies more militant than others? Who are the most vital workers in each operation? Whose absence would be most noticeable? Are they active or inactive in the union? Are there other unions in the workplace? Can we count on them for support in time of trouble? Do we play an active role in central labor councils and other community organizations, e.g., NOW, NAACP, etc.?
Are we known by the public? Does the public understand our basic philosophy on collective bargaining? [Now is the time to get to know reporters from the newspaper, radio and TV and give them a background understanding of our collective bargaining goals.]
Is the public likely to understand and support our position if negotiations break down? As we develop our negotiation position, it should be done in a way to gain support from our members, of course, but also from the public. If this is a public sector union, local and state level politicians need to know what we stand for and what we won't stand for and what our ballot box power potential is.
We must know who is calling the shots in management. Are they on the negotiating team or in the head office? Is management likely to have the public on its side? What about the media? How do they like our management?
It is imperative that we realistically understand our own power and weaknesses, as well as management's. Without this understanding we won't be negotiating the best possible contract for our members. And strikes (an ultimate weapon, like the atom bomb, which might never be mentioned but are in the back of both sides' negotiators' minds) are frequently the result of miscalculations.
PLANNING IS A MUST! It should include:
What clauses should be re-worded for clarification? Is clarification always desirable? Are there risks to seeking clarification?
Where issues were settled to our satisfaction, might it be better to leave that language alone and count on precedent - or seek to clarify the language?
How should we prepare in case management comes in with demands to tighten up language in clauses related to grievances they lost?
What grievances did we lose? Were they important enough to try to change the contract clause?
The same questions apply to any arbitration cases or law suits - except that it must be assumed that these will definitely be important issues for each side.
What dissatisfaction have arisen since the last contract was negotiated which were never submitted as grievances, either because there was no applicable contract clause or for some other reason?
Compare the existing contract with other contracts in your industry, area or sector.
Research departments can supply information on settlements, wages, fringes and other conditions of employment in other contracts.
What issues did we fail to win during the last negotiations?
What things have been achieved since the last negotiations outside the contract?
Is management having difficulty recruiting in any job categories because our wages and salaries are not competitive?
Have increases been granted to individuals or groups because of a shortage of skilled help?
What has management done outside the scope of the bargaining relationship that may help us?
How is the negotiating committee perceived? Which constituency thinks that it is represented by which committee member? Does the committee understand that each member represents ill the members, not a special interest group? Will the committee hang touch? Will it hang together? Does the team feel it has flexible authority with final ratification left to the membership (not necessarily the same as the bargaining unit)?
The committee must realize that the negotiation of a contract is a TEAM EFFORT. The "team" is the entire union membership. Every member of the team has a role to play, and an important part of the committee's job is to educate the members to gain maximum participation.
Key negotiating issues are best chosen by a dialogue between leadership and membership. The leadership needs to listen to the members and also make recommendations based on its own information, insight and experience.
Besides survey Questionnaires, what other written or verbal communications have there been to keep the membership informed while still keeping your strategy and tactics confidential? This dialogue is an educational process for the leadership, membership - and management. Members tell what has been bothering them personally while learning about the importance of general issues such as pension plans, health and welfare funds, union security, etc.
During this period pressure builds on management. Everyone gets some notion of what is hoped for and what to expect. With the development of demands and expectations, the membership should become more unified, more determined - more powerful.
Before numbers are selected for economic demands, concepts need to be agreed upon.
Do we want ... percentage increases or dollar increases?
A minimum salary schedule, across-the-board raises, merit raises - or a combination?
Is it better to get all the money possible early in the term of the contract or split it? Front-end loading versus bigger (but later) benefits?
In insurance, do we demand dollar expenditures by management or certain levels of benefits? Union administered or a commercial plan purchase by the employer?
What is the relation between the full negotiating committee, the sub-committee(s) and side-bars?
After consulting with members and balancing various factors - inequities, cost, political atmosphere, management's probable reaction - PRIORITEES should be given to various contract demands. Although priorities must remain flexible - and may be changed during the course of negotiations - they should be consciously arrived at and should not be just responses to management's stance. The negotiation team's priorities, tactics and strategies need not be revealed to the membership (and thus, inevitably, to management) in advance of negotiations. Written policies, unofficial practices and legal requirements must be kept in mind.
The committee must prepare detailed justification for all demands and make them sound reasonable. Try to be consistent with previous positions or have plausible reasons for your change. [It is hard to argue for fewer incremental steps one year but more steps the next year.]
In the presentation to management and to the public, it is better to emphasize the complete reasonableness of our positions rather than how aggressive and demanding we are. We must be prepared with documentation for each demand, such as examples of problems, witnesses and economic date.
The proposals must be drafted with the possibility of compromise in mind. FALL BACK POSITIONS should be prepared carefully and not be improvised on the spot.
Prior to the bargaining sessions, it is important for committee members to understand everyone's role:
Who will be the spokesperson?
How will the team be used?
Shall we have a good guy and a bad guy?
One or more members of the team should take notes. [Word-for-word transcripts inhibit free collective bargaining and should be opposed.]
Committee members must control their behavior and attitudes during sessions.
There must be a method for committee members to communicate with the spokesperson. Note passing is better than whispering but too much agitated note passing may signal information to management. Recesses and caucuses should be planned for. Each member of the negotiating team should be able to call for a caucus but bear in mind that the ab